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I. SYNOPSIS
This article explores whether the determination of the exis-
tence of a duty to warn is one for the court or the jury. The au-
thors examine several cases in which the courts expressly state that
the issue is solely one for the court, even when reasonable persons
might disagree on the underlying issue of foreseeability. The arti-
cle then presents the better view, followed by some courts and sup-
ported by the Restatement (Second) of Torts, requiring jury resolution
of any reasonably disputed foreseeability issues as a precursor to
the determination of the existence of a duty to warn.
II. INTRODUCTION
Manufacturers in products liability actions regularly face "fail-
ure-to-warn" claims in addition to allegations of design and manu-
facturing defects. For example, plaintiffs may claim that they
should have been warned not to operate an industrial press without
a hand-guard, or not to splice a power cord on an appliance, or not
to turn a control knob with a tool. Whether phrased in strict liabil-
ity, warranty, or negligence terms, failure-to-warn claims are typi-
cally decided under a negligence analysis requiring foreseeability of
the use (or misuse) as a predicate to imposition of liability.' Manu-
facturers often argue against warnings-based liability on the ground
that the use was not reasonably foreseeable. For example, the
1. E.g., Douglas R. Richmond, Renewed Look at the Duty to Warn and Affirmative
Defenses, 61 DEF. COUNS. J. 205, 207-208 (1994) (discussing failure-to-warn claims);
JAMES T. O'REILLY, PRODUCr WARNINGS: DEFECTS AND HAzARDs § 6.02(A)-(B) (2 d
ed. 1999) (discussing failure-to-warn claims).
[Vol. 27:1
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manufacturer might argue that the danger was obvious and thus it
could not foresee the user encountering the risk, or that the plain-
tiff used the product in an unforeseeable manner causing unfore-
seeable risks. The question explored by this article is whether the
court or the jury should finally resolve these foreseeability issues in
determining failure-to-warn liability.
Many courts routinely hold that the existence of a duty to warn
is a question of law for the court, separate from what they consider
jury issues, such as adequacy of the warning, breach of the duty,
and causation.2 However, the primary consideration in answering
the duty-to-warn question is the foreseeability to the manufacturer
of the manner of use of the product and/or the danger resulting
from that use. Whether a particular use should have been antici-
pated or provided for is intuitively a question of social expecta-
tion-"what do we reasonably require of this actor under the cir-
cumstances?"-that has long been recognized by tort law as for the
jury.
Indeed, despite the fact that some courts state that the exis-
tence of a duty to warn is a legal issue decided by the court's de-
termination of foreseeability, those courts may or should have at
least an implicit understanding that the jury must make the ulti-
mate determination of foreseeability if the issue is reasonably in
dispute. The court's role in a given case should be no more than to
make a threshold determination of whether there is any reasonable
dispute on foreseeability (and, thus, the existence of a duty) for
jury resolution.
There are substantial dangerous consequences for both plain-
tiffs and defendants if the court in a particular case heeds the ex-
press terms of the case law pronouncements that the existence of a
duty to warn is solely an issue for the court. Most significant to the
plaintiffs claim is the risk of an adverse directed verdict. If the
court assumes the position that it alone determines the existence of
a duty, it logically must dismiss claims in which it resolves the fore-
seeability issue against the plaintiff. Ajudge with a particular social
perspective or political attitude may believe that the use was absurd
or the abuse incredible and dismiss the case, even though another
judge or a more diversified jury could reach a different conclusion.
Seemingly, if the facts allow reasonable disagreement about
whether the risk was foreseeable (i.e., vested with the obligation to
anticipate or deal with), the jury should be given the issue.
2. See discussion infra Part IV.
2000]
3
Flynn and Laravuso: The Existence of a Duty to Warn: A Question for the Court or the
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2000
WILLIAM MITCHELL LA W REVIEW
The warnings-claim defendant is also prejudiced by the court
solely determining the existence of a duty. If the court holds that
the plaintiffs use of the product was foreseeable, that determina-
tion is the final word. Logically, the court must then instruct the
jury that a duty in the particular case exists and give the jury only
the questions of the adequacy of the warning, breach of the duty,• 3
and causation. If the defendant has not issued a warning, liability
is probably axiomatic. The duty is obviously breached and the
warnings "inadequate." Because of the commonly employed rebut-
table presumption that a warning would have been heeded, causa-
tion may be academic unless the defendant can establish facts prov-
ing that the warning would not have prevented the injury.
III. BACKGROUND ON THE DUTY TO WARN
In general, the duty to warn may be summarized as follows:
A manufacturer or other seller is subject to liability for
failing either to warn or adequately to warn about a risk
or hazard inherent in the way a product is designed that
is related to the intended uses as well as the reasonably
foreseeable uses that may be made of the products it
sells.4
A. Sources Of Warnings-Related Liability
One source courts rely on to impose warnings-related liability
is the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 388, which provides:
One who supplies directly or through a third person a
chattel for another to use is subject to liability to those
whom the supplier should expect to use the chattel with
the consent of the other or to be endangered by its prob-
able use, for physical harm caused by the use of the chat-
tel in the manner for which and by a person for whose
use it is supplied, if the supplier
(a) knows or has reason to know that the chattel is or is
likely to be dangerous for the use for which it is supplied,
and
3. But see discussion infra Part VII (discussing how adequacy of warning is
not a separate issue from breach of duty).
4. W. PAGE KEETON ETAL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 96, at
685 (5" ed. 1984).
[Vol. 27:1
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(b) has no reason to believe that those for whose use the
chattel is supplied will realize its dangerous condition,
and
(c) fails to exercise reasonable care to inform them of its
dangerous condition or of the facts which make it likely
to be dangerous.
5
Courts also frequently rely on comments h, j, and k to the
"strict liability" provisions of the Restatement (Second) of Torts section
402A for warnings-related liability.' The comments incorporate the
failure to provide adequate warning of a danger that the seller "has
reason to anticipate.. .may result from a particular use" into the
framework of products that are defective and unreasonably dan-
7
gerous.
As is well-known by the products liability bar, the Restatement
(Third) of Torts: Products Liability now expressly sets out inadequate
instruction or warning as a category of product defect for which a
manufacturer is liable:
A product is defective when, at the time of sale or distri-
bution, it contains a manufacturing defect, is defective in
design, or defective because of inadequate instructions or
warnings.. .A product:
(c) is defective because of inadequate instructions or
warnings when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the
product could have been reduced or avoided by the pro-
vision of reasonable instructions or warnings by the seller
or other distributor.. .and the omission of the instruc-
tions or warnings renders the product not reasonably
safe.8
B. Theoretical Framework For Failure-To-Warn Claims
The various Restatement provisions of the duty to warn set forth
above all require that the need for a warning must be reasonably
foreseeable. Thus, in the majority of jurisdictions, the inquiry is
negligence-based.
Some courts permit plaintiffs to frame failure-to-warn claims in
5. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 388 (1965). E.g., Natural Gas Odoriz-
ing, Inc. v. Downs, 685 N.E.2d 155, 163 n.ll (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (relying on sec-
tion 388 in discussing circumstances justifying delegation of duty to warn).
6. Richmond, supra note 1, at 207-08.
7. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. h (1965).
8. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 (1998).
2000]
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terms of strict liability, negligence, or warranty concepts.9 Confu-
sion has been generated by some courts attempting to preserve a
distinction between negligent and strict liability failure-to-warn
claims." In fact, a minority ofjurisdictions excuse the foreseeability
test in a strict liability failure-to-warn claim." However, the majority
rule is that, regardless of the purported underlying theory, failure-
to-warn claims are essentially negligence-based and require a find-
ing that the manufacturer reasonably should have foreseen the
danger and reasonably should have warned or instructed to prevent
the injury. 
1 2
The foreseeability issue may be two-fold. Obviously, the manu-
facturer must have been able to foresee the danger or risk that ul-
timately injured the plaintiff. However, the manufacturer often ar-
gues that it could not foresee that danger because the plaintiff used
(or, from the manufacturer's perspective, misused) the product in
an unforeseeable manner. Liability is imposed only where the use
or misuse was reasonably foreseeable.
1 3
lV. AUTHORITY FOR THE PROPOSITION THAT THE EXISTENCE OF A
DUTY To WARN IS SOLELY A QUESTION OF LAW FOR THE COURT
A number of courts hold, unequivocally and without signifi-
cant analysis, that the existence of a duty to warn is a question of
law for the court alone. 4 The Minnesota Supreme Court, in Ger-
mann v. FL. Smithe Machine Co.,15 summarized the inquiry as fol-
9. Richmond, supra note 1, at 205 n.4.
10. O'REILLY, supra note 1, at § 6.02(B).
11. Id.
12. Richmond, supra note 1, at 205; see also Germann v. F.L. Smithe Machine
Co., 395 N.W.2d 922, 926 n.4 (Minn. 1986) (noting that strict liability to warn is
based upon principles of negligence); Natural Gas Odorizing, 685 N.E.2d at 163
n.11 (acknowledging that "there is no doctrinal distinction between negligence
and strict liability failure-to-warn actions under the Restatement"); KEETON ET AL.,
supra note 4, § 99 at 697 (noting the "generally accepted view" is that failure-to-
warn claim requires proof of negligence even if framed in strict-liability terms).
13. See Richmond, supra note 1, at 206.
14. See generally O'REILLY, supra note 1, at § 6.02(A) (noting that a court de-
termines whether duty to warn existed based on foreseeability of risk, obviousness
of danger, and common knowledge of the danger); 63A AM. JUR. 2D. Prod. L. §
1216 (1997 & Supp. 1999) (stating the existence of a duty to warn is generally a
question of law for a court unless the "record is in dispute"); 63 AM. JUR. 2D. Prod.
L. § 151 (1996 & Supp. 1999) (noting a court held that the existence of a compo-
nent manufacturer's duty to warn is a question of law for the court requiring con-
sideration of foreseeability issues).
15. 395 N.W.2d 922 (Minn. 1986).
[Vol. 27:1
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lows:
[T] he court goes to the event causing the damage and
looks back to the alleged negligent act. If the connection
is too remote to impose liability as a matter of public pol-
icy, the courts then hold there is no duty and conse-
quently no liability. On the other hand, if the conse-
quence is direct and is the type of occurrence that was or
should have been reasonably foreseeable, the courts then
hold as a matter of law a duty exists.
16
The case law generally holds that once the court determines
the existence of a duty to warn, it should instruct the jury on the
adequacy of the warning, breach of the duty, and causation. Most
significant in this framework is that it purports to prohibit the
judge from allowing the jury to determine the existence of a duty to
warn-a determination based on a foreseeability evaluation that
clearly seems to require jury resolution. s
A. Examples Of Cases Holding That The Existence Of A Duty To Warn Is
A Question Of Law For The Court Alone
1. Balder v. Haley (Minnesota)
In Balder v. Haley,'9 the Minnesota Supreme Court held that
the trial court erred in allowing the jury to determine the existence
of a duty to warn. The plaintiff was injured in a gas explosion
caused by a leak at the valve of his mother's water heater." Uncon-
troverted evidence established: (1) use of the gas valve for many
years without a control knob (which had broken), but rather by
turning the reset shaft to which the knob had been attached; (2)
repeated "repair" of a leak around the reset shaft, which was pro-
ducing a small flame at that location, by "plugging" the leak several
16. Germann, 395 N.W.2d at 924-25 (citing Christianson v. Chicago St. P., M.
& 0. Ry. Co., 67 Minn. 94, 69 N.W. 640 (1896)).
17. Id.
18. Infra Part V. One article argues persuasively that Germann and its progeny
have "creat[ed] confusion and depriv[ed] litigants of the community judgment
provided by juries." George W. Soule and Jacqueline M. Moen, Failure to Warn in
Minnesota, the New Restatement on Products Liability, and the Application of the Reason-
able Care Standard, 21 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 389, 392-93 (1995). The authors then
call upon the Minnesota Supreme Court to "take the opportunity that the Re-
statement (Third) presents to correct the failure-to-warn analysis in Minnesota."
Id. at 397.
19. 399 N.W.2d 77 (Minn. 1987).
20. Id at 78.
20001
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times with dental wax; and (3) the plaintiffs mother was re peatedly
warned by a repairman not to use and to replace the valve.
Plaintiff claimed negligence and strict liability against the valve
manufacturer, including failure to adequately warn of dangers as-
sociated with use of the valve." The jury found that the manufac-
turer was not liable and divided fault among the plaintiff, his
23
mother, and the repairman. The Minnesota Court of Appeals re-
versed in part, holding the manufacturer negligent as a matter of
law for failure to warn and remanding for a jury determination of
causation.24
The Minnesota Supreme Court held that, for procedural rea-
sons, the court of appeals abused its discretion in even considering
the failure-to-warn issue. More significantly, though, the supreme
court went on to cite Germann and emphasize that the trial court
should not have submitted the issue of the existence of a duty to
warn to the jury in the first place because it was a purely legal ques-
26tion for the court. Stating that "[t] here is 'no duty to warn of an
improper use that could not have been foreseen,"' the court held
that the manufacturer could not foresee the improper use or al-
teration of the valve or the danger presented thereby and, thus,
27that there was no duty to warn.
Critically, the court did not couch its holding as a determina-
tion that no reasonable juror could conclude otherwise. In other
words, the court did not take the issue away from the jury but,
rather, held that the foreseeability issue in the duty-to-warn context
is solely for the court. Indeed, the court did not even revisit or ana-
lyze in any detail the facts set forth earlier in the opinion when
holding that there was no duty.
2. Genaust v. Ill. Power Co. (Illinois)
The Supreme Court of Illinois, in Genaust v. Ill. Power Co.,
similarly held that foreseeability in the context of a failure-to-warn
claim is a question for the court alone. In Genaust, the plaintiff
21. Id. at 78-79.
22. Id. at 80.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 80-81.
25. Id. at 80.
26. Id. at 81.
27. Id. (citing Frey v. Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc., 258 N.W.2d 782, 788
(Minn. 1977)).
28. 343 N.E.2d 465 (Iii. 1976).
[Vol. 27:1
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contracted to install a steel tower and antenna on top of a roof.
29
As he was doing so, the antenna came close to some uninsulated
power lines owned by the power company. Electrical current
arced between the power lines and the antenna, traveled through
the steel tower, and electrocuted the plaintiff.31
One of the plaintiffs claims was that the tower and antenna
were unreasonably dangerous products because "they failed to have
adequate warnings or labels attached informing users of the danger
of electrical arcing if either of the products were brought in close
proximity to power wires. ''12 In affirming the trial court's dismissal
of the action on the pleadings, the supreme court of Illinois stated:
"The determination of whether a duty to warn exists is a question
of law and not of fact. Underlying such a determination is neces-
sarily the question of foreseeability, which, in the context of deter-
mining the existence of a duty, is for the court to resolve.""
Thus, the Genaust court expressly assumed the role of deter-
mining foreseeability as the predicate for holding that a duty to
warn existed.
The court went on to hold, as a matter of law, that it was not
"objectively reasonable for [defendant manufacturers and sellers of
the tower and antenna] to expect a user of their products to be in-
jured in the manner in which plaintiff was injured. '' The court re-
lied on the fact that the plaintiff admitted that the danger of elec-
tricity is common knowledge and, more significantly, simply stated
that "it is common knowledge that metal will conduct electricity.
35
The court concluded that "it is not objectively reasonable to expect
that a person, knowing the danger of electricity if metal should
contact electrical wires, would attempt to install a metal tower and
antenna in such close proximity to electrical wires.,
36
The court acknowledged that the injury resulted not from di-
rect contact with the power lines, but arcing from the lines to the
antenna and tower." Nonetheless, the court believed that the




32. Id. at 465.
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foresee a user installing the products so close to the lines, when
there were obvious "harsh consequences of the slightest mishap."
3
The court, therefore, affirmed dismissal of the action on the plead-
ings.
Like the Minnesota Supreme Court in Balder, the Genaust court
did not suggest that it was resolving the foreseeability issue because
it believed that no reasonable jurors could disagree. Rather, the
court held that foreseeability in the duty-to-warn context was never
ajury issue but one for the court alone.
3. Pettis v. Nalco Chem. Co. (Michigan)
Courts have also held, as a matter of law, that a duty to warn
does exist. In Pettis v. Nalco Chem. Co., 40 the plaintiff was injured
when molten steel that he was pouring into a mold exploded.4'
The plaintiff claimed that the explosion was caused by excess mois-
ture in a coating regularly applied to the inside surface of the
42mold. - The coating apparently had been applied though use of a
43bucket rather than a spray gun. The plaintiff argued that this re-
sulted in over-application and a slower evaporation time for mois-
ture within the coating.44
The evidence was undisputed that the plaintiff and all employ-
ees understood that moisture in the mold presented a danger of• 45
explosion. However, they did not know that the coating should
not be applied by means other than the spray gun and did not
know exactly how long it took for moisture to evaporate from the
46coating at various temperatures. The plaintiff claimed that the
coating manufacturer had a duty to warn of proper and improper
application techniques.47 • . 48
The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff. The trial court
then granted the manufacturer's motion for a directed verdict.
In reinstating the verdict, the court of appeals of Michigan
38. Id.
39. Id. at 472.
40. 388 N.W.2d 343 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986).
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ruled that the trial court should have held that a duty to warn ex-
isted:
It is well-settled law that the question of duty is to be re-
solved by the court rather than the jury. We find that de-
fendant owed a legal duty to provide warnings with its
product .... Because the danger of a severe explosion was
not obvious, and because it was foreseeable that the
product would be applied other than by spraying, there
was a duty to warn potential users that over-application of
the product would cause an explosion.50
Thus, the Pettis court also expressly accepted sole responsibility
for resolving the foreseeability issue in ultimately holding, as a mat-
ter of law, that the manufacturer had a duty to warn.
B. Summary Of The Case Law's Implications
The mandate of these cases in failure-to-warn claims is two-
fold: (1) the court alone must resolve the issue of the foreseeability
of a risk in ruling whether a duty-to-warn exists; and (2) if a court
determines that a duty to warn exists, it should advise the jury that
it has found such a duty and then instruct the jury only on the ade-
quacy of the warning, breach of the duty, and causation.
Of course, if the court truly resolved the foreseeability issues
and there was no warning, the breach and adequacy determina-
tions (which, as discussed later, are one and the same) would be
axiomatic and should not go to the jury. Causation may still re-
main for jury resolution, but typically only where there is evidence
that the plaintiff subjectively knew of the danger anyway, that the
plaintiff would not have heeded the warnings, or that the event was
actually caused by something other than the danger that the plain-
tiff claims should have been warned against.
V. AUTHORITY FOR THE PROPOSITION THAT THE EXISTENCE OF A
DUTY To WARN MAY REQUIREJURY RESOLUTION OF FORESEEABILITY
ISSUES
The problem presented by the above cases is that the court
may infringe, one way or another, on what should be the jury func-
tion of resolving foreseeability. The problem likely is avoided
50. Id.
51. Soule & Moen, supra note 18, at 397 (discussing lack of any "conceptual
difference" between design and defect claims that would support "significant de-
20001
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much of the time by court intuition and common sense. More ap-
propriately, though, it should be avoided in every case by following
significant authority for the better view-that the foreseeability is-
sue is for the jury where reasonable minds could disagree under
the facts of the case.
A. The Common Sense Considerations
Former Minnesota Supreme CourtJustice John E. Simonett in-
sightfully discussed the danger posed by the frequent pronounce-
ment that the court must decide the issue of whether a duty to
warn exists:
Some of the language in Germann has been interpreted to
mean that ajury never decides whether a duty to warn ex-
ists. The trial court must decide, of course, based on the
evidence, whether to submit the issue of failure to warn
to the jury. This is a question of law for the court. Put
another way, it is a question of law for the judge whether
there is a question of fact for the jury. In submitting a
failure to warn claim to the jury, the trial court ordinarily
is instructing the jury to determine from all the evidence
if, in fact, the risk to be warned against was reasonably
foreseeable, so that a duty to warn was necessary; and, if
so, whether any warnings were adequate or could have
been effective (which relates to the scope of the duty);
and, finally, whether the duty was breached and causa-
tion was present. In a particular case, one or more of
these questions may be decided by the trial court as a
matter of law and the jury so told. But otherwise, gener-
ally, the jury decides if a duty to warn exists and if it was
breached."
Justice Simonett thus recognized that courts should not decide
foreseeability issues where reasonable jurors could disagree.
The Minnesota pattern jury instructions, quoting Justice Si-
monett's analysis in commentary, contemplate that the jury will be
asked to determine the foreseeability issues despite Germann and its
progeny:
A manufacturer has a duty to provide reasonably ade-
parture from the traditional roles of court and jury").
52. John E. Simonett, Dispelling the Products Liability Syndrome: Tentative Draft
No. 2 of the Restatement (Third), 21 WM. MITCHELL. L. REv. 361, 365 (1995).
[Vol. 27:1
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quate (warnings) (instructions) for its products to those
who use the product when the product:
1. Is used as intended, or
2. Is used in a way that the manufacturer could rea-
sonably have anticipated.
A manufacturer has a duty to use reasonable care in de-
ciding whether (to warn of dangers involved in using its
product) (to provide instructions for safe use of the prod-
uct).
In deciding whether the manufacturer should have pro-
vided (warnings) (instructions), consider all the facts and
circumstances, including, among others:
1. The likelihood that harm would result from use of
the product
2. The seriousness of the harm that would result
3. The cost and ease of providing (warnings) (instruc-
tions) that would avoid the harm
4. Whether the manufacturer considered the scientific
53knowledge and advances in the field...
Assuming that the pattern instructions are substantially fol-
lowed, the jury will be instructed to resolve the foreseeability issue
as a predicate to a liability determination (even if the trial court
purports to have "resolved" the foreseeability issue in holding that a
duty existed). The inquiry set out by the pattern instructions is not
functionally different from that set forth in Germann and quoted in
section IV above, purportedly to guide a court's resolution of the
foreseeability issue.
Even the Balder court, despite pronouncing that the existence
of a duty to warn is solely an issue for the court, seemed to have
some implicit recognition that the foreseeability issue is 'jury-like.!'
After clearly ruling that the issue was one for the court, the Minne-
sota Supreme Court noted that the plaintiff had failed to object to
the trial court's submission of the issue to the jury.54 Holding that
any objection was waived, the court proceeded to review and up-
hold the jury's implicit determination of no duty under a "suffi-
ciency-of-the-evidence" standard.5  The court expressed no diffi-
53. 4A MINNESOTA PRACTICE § 75.25 (4 ed. 1999).
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culty reviewing the issue as it would any other factual issue.56 It may
be that the court instinctively recognized that the foreseeability is-
sue may require jury consideration.
The tone of Justice Simonett's analysis reflects some confi-
dence that most trial courts will ultimately appreciate that they
cannot take disputed issues on foreseeability from the jury. How-
ever, there is clear authority for his analysis that was simply unrec-
ognized by the courts above.
B. Established Authority For Giving The Foreseeability Issue To The Jury
1. Comment e To The Restatement (Second) Of Torts § 328B
Comment e to the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 328 B pro-
vides:
It is the further function of the court to determine
whether, upon facts in evidence which the jury may rea-
sonably find to be true, the law imposes upon the defen-
dant any legal duty to act or to refrain from acting for the
protection of the plaintiff. This decision is always for the
court... Where the existence of the duty will depend upon the ex-
istence or non-existence of a fact as to which the jury may rea-
sonably come to either one of two conclusions ... then it becomes
the duty of the court to instruct the juy as to the defendant's
duty, or absence of duty, if either conclusion as to such fact is
drawn.57
The section provides plain and sensible authority for courts to
relinquish the foreseeability issue to the jury where it is reasonably
disputed.
2. Butz v. Werner (North Dakota)
58
The Supreme Court of North Dakota in Butz v. Werner cited
Comment e to the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 328B in hold-
ing that the jury must decide foreseeability issues as they affect the59
existence of a duty to warn. In Butz, the plaintiff was being towed
by boat on a "Super Tube" water toy and hit a parked boat close to
56. Id.
57. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328 B, cmt. e (1965) (emphasis
added) (discussing the function of courts in the proof of negligence generally).
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shore. 6° He alleged that the manufacturer should have warned: (1)
of a maximum towing speed; (2) that the tube "would accelerate
and arc around corners;" (3) that the rider could not control the
tube's direction or speed; and (4) that spray from the tube would
obstruct the rider's visibility.6"
The tube manufacturer argued that the dangers were open
and obvious and, thus, that it had no duty to warn as a matter of
law.62 The court rejected the contention that the issue was one for
the court:
In a negligence action, whether a duty exists is generally
a preliminary question of law for the court. However, if
the existence of a duty depends upon factual determina-
tions, their resolution is for the trier of fact. The appro-
priate procedure in such cases is for the court to instruct
the jury as to the defendant's duty, or absence of duty, if
certain facts are found.63
The court held that whether the danger was open and obvious
was a question for the jury.64 In other words, the court held that
the jury had to decide whether the accident and plaintiffs injuries
were foreseeable in the absence of a warning.
3. Liriano v. Hobart Corp. (Second Circuit)
Similarly, in Liriano v. Hobart Corp.,65 the Second Circuit held
that the obviousness of a danger had to be resolved by ajury as partf • • • 66
of the determination of whether a duty to warn existed. In Liri-
ano, the plaintiff was injured by a meat grinder from which his em-
ployer or another person had removed the safety guard. 67 The ma-
chine did not have a warning against operation without the guard.
68
The court held that it did not even need to resolve the con-
flicting New York case law on whether the risk posed by meat
grinders was obvious as a matter of law.69 The court recognizedthat, although many New Yorkers know that meat grinders are dan-
60. Id. at 510.
61. Id. at 512.
62. Id. at 511-12.
63. Id. at 511 (citations omitted).
64. Id. at512.
65. 170 F.3d 264 (2°d Cir. 1999).
66. Idat 271.
67. Id. at 266.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 271.
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gerous, the plaintiff was seventeen at the time, was a recent immi-
grant, had only worked for a week, had never been instructed on
the use of the meat grinder, and had used it only a few times.70 The
court stated that there might be "enough" meat grinders who did
not know that safety guards were available and should be used to
reduce the risk of injury that the court could not "say, as a matter of
law, that [the manufacturer] had no duty to warn [the plaintiff].""
The court affirmed the trial court's submission of the foreseeabil-
ity/open-and-obvious issues to the jury as a predicate to determin-
ing whether the manufacturer had a duty to warn.72
C. Summary Of The Better View On Analyzing The Existence Of A Duty
To Warn
The courts should not determine alone the existence of a duty
to warn. When the issue turns on a reasonably disputed foresee-
ability of the risk posed by a product, the jury should resolve the
dispute. The contrary opinions discussed above do not seem to ex-
pressly disagree as much as they simply fail to examine the issue. In
any event, there does not appear to be any authority for the court
to make the foreseeability determination for a failure-to-warn claim
73when it is a classic jury question in other contexts.
Revisiting the decision in Genaust v. Ill. Power Co. helps demon-
strate why the court should not alone determine foreseeability.
The Genaust court first stated that "it is not objectively reasonable to
expect that a person, knowing of the danger of electricity if metal
should contact electrical wires, would attempt to install a metal
tower and antenna in such close proximity to electrical wires.,
7 4
The plaintiff, though, apparently had evidence that such antenna
set-ups were common in areas with the type of uninsulated power
lines that caused his injury.75 It seems arguable, at least, that the
plaintiffs evidence created a reasonable dispute as to whether the
tower and antenna manufacturers should have foreseen that peo-
ple would attempt installation near power lines and, thus, had a
duty to warn of the dangers.
More significantly, though, is the fact that the plaintiff was in-
70. Id. at 269.
71. Id. at 271.
72. Id.
73. Soule & Moen, supra note 18, at 396 n.52.
74. Genaust v. Ill. Power Co., 343 N.E.2d 465, 465 (I11. 976).
75. Id. at 470.
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jured by arcing from the wires to the antenna (not direct contact)
and the arcing danger was the basis of his failure-to-warn claim.
Plaintiff did not claim that he needed to be warned not to touch
the wire with the antenna, which he may have been careful to en-76
sure. The court casually dismissed this fact, holding that the
plaintiffs conduct was not reasonably foreseeable given "the harsh
consequences of the slightest mishap.",
77
The court appears to have missed the real issue-whether it
was reasonable for the manufacturer to expect that consumers
would know that arcing (apparently the "slightest mishap" that the
court refers to) could occur and cause injury. The foreseeability of
that danger, especially given that the plaintiff had at least some evi-
dence that the installation he attempted was common, seems to
raise a fact question that should not have been resolved by the
court based upon its own belief of what reasonable consumers
know about the arcing properties of electricity. Indeed, the court
never even stated that arcing specifically was a commonly known
danger.
Had the court approached the duty issue under the approach
set forth in comment e to the Restatement (Second) of Torts section
328B, it is unlikely that it would have dismissed the plaintiffs fail-
ure-to-warn claim as a matter of law. Rather, the jury would have
determined whether it was reasonably foreseeable that consumers
of the products would expose themselves to the arcing danger and
whether that danger was open and obvious to expected consumers.
VI. WHEN AND How MAYA COURT DETERMINE THAT THERE Is No
DuTYAsA MATTER OF LAW?
This analysis does not suggest that a court may never deter-
mine, as a matter of law, that there is no duty to warn. The authors
suggest that there are two broad circumstances under which a court
may properly do so.
A. Determination Of No Duty As A Matter Of Law Because No
Reasonable Jurors Could Disagree On The Foreseeability Issue
As with any purported fact dispute, a court may take the issue
of foreseeability from the jury if it determines that no reasonable
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jury could disagree on the resolution of the issue."' This well-
established rule needs no elaboration beyond the standard cau-
tionary advice that the court must not substitute its own judgment
on the issue if any reasonable person could arrive at a different
conclusion.
B. Defenses Based On Atypical Relationships Between The Parties
A court often may be able to resolve the duty issue as a matter
of law when faced with defenses concerning the relationship of the
parties. For example: (1) the sophisticated user defense, where
warnings may not be required for users with special knowledge of
the dangers; (2) the bulk supplier defense, allowing a manufac-
turer of bulk products to rely on a downstream packager to provide
warnings;"° or (3) the learned intermediary defense, which typically
arises in pharmaceutical cases and allows the manufacturer to rely
on the prescribing physician to warn the user.8 ' The focus of these
defenses on the relationship of the parties raises perhaps the
broadest public policy-based considerations involved in the deter-
mination of the existence of a duty. Therefore, the application of
the defenses in a particular case may be decided more appropri-
ately decided by a court, at least where, as may be typical, there is
no genuine dispute as to the status on which the defense is based.
VII. ISSUES THAT REMAIN FOR THEJURY IF A DUTY To WARN EXISTS
The case law often states that the issues that remain for the
jury, once a duty to warn has been established, are the adequacy of
82the warning, breach of the duty, and causation. Perhaps because
of the confusion discussed in this article on whether foreseeability
is a question of law or fact, these courts may be trying to "give
something back" to the jury by proposing separate inquiries into
the adequacy of the warning and breach of the duty. However, the
adequacy of the warning is nothing more than an issue going to
78. E.g., Brown v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 667 P.2d 750, 756 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1983) (holding, as a matter of law, there was no duty to warn where "reasonable
minds could not differ as to the obviousness of [the] danger").
79. Richmond, supra note 1, at 211-12.
80. Id. at 212.
81. Id. at 212-13.
82. E.g., Germann v. F.L. Smithe Mach. Co., 395 N.W.2d 922, 924-25 (Minn.
1986) (noting that whether a duty exists is a matter of law, and that "Other issues
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whether the duty was breached. An adequate warning must mean
that there is no breach of the duty, not that there is no duty. Con-
ceptually, there is no reason to parse out the adequacy issue from
determination of breach.
The courts correctly state that causation remains, as in all neg-
ligence cases, a fact issue to be resolved by the jury unless no rea-
sonable persons could disagree.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The better rule is that when reasonably disputed foreseeability
issues exist in a failure-to-warn claim, the court should submit those
issues to the jury as a precursor to determining the existence of the
duty. Contrary case law does not analyze the issue in detail and
may mislead later courts attempting to properly resolve the claims.
There does not appear to be any justification for permitting the
court to resolve reasonably disputed foreseeability issues that, in
other contexts, are routinely submitted to the jury.
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